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Introduction
Why do we think that we can rule [Iraq] ? This is American imperialism you're hearing up here. And that hasn't worked and it will never work. Senator Mike Gravel (2007) This is not an empire. We don't go out and occupy a territory for personal gain.
We're there because we know that if we change the situation on the ground in a place like Iraq or Afghanistan, that freedom is the best antidote to terror, that democracies don't produce and breed the kind of terrorist extremists that hit us on 9/11. Vice President Richard Cheney (2004) 1 S ince the United States was founded in opposition to the British Empire, "empire" has fascinated and frightened Americans with its ambivalent connotations of power and prestige, doom and decline. As ex-Senator Mike Gravel and former Vice President Richard Cheney did on the occasion of the Iraq War, policymakers usually reject the label, whereas dissenters seek to apply it. 2 These uses of the "empire" epithet indicate that debates on foreign policy transcend their narrow confines and turn into "great debates" about American values and America's purpose and role in the world. As David Levy has remarked, these are "moment[s] of critical and traumatic self -scrutiny for the American people" even though their contents relate to foreign policy questions. 3 This solipsist quality renders the analysis of such debates particularly rewarding because the debates illustrate differing conceptions of American nationalism, of what the United States is or ought to be.
The debate at the heart of this study became "officially" known as the "imperialism debate," in which Americans discussed the desirability of acquiring former Spanish colonies occupied in the 1898 war against Spain-most notably Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Among all "great debates" on foreign policy, from the war with Mexico in 1848 to the recent one in Iraq, it alone revolved around colonial expansion, the acquisition of overseas territory, that no one considered integrating into the American state. Like the other debates, however, the one on imperialism was characterized by a surprising degree of consensus on American national identity and by disagreements about that identity's implications for the conduct of foreign policy. Imperialists and anti-imperialists justified their foreign policy strategies by appealing to American exceptionalism, the belief that the United States was unique as the first nation founded on democratic ideals rather than on historical boundaries or ethnic cohesion.
At first glance, this seems paradoxical: a divisive debate was based on a fundamental consensus. This empirical observation prompted one analytical interest of this study: an inquiry into why exceptionalism is malleable enough to accommodate different foreign policy strategies. On one level, imperialists and their opponents interpreted the mandates of exceptionalism differently: While imperialists claimed that being unique endowed the United States with a special right to actively proselytize in the name of democracy, their opponents insisted that exceptionalism bestowed a duty to refrain from aggressive behavior in the international arena. Democracy, they maintained, would be more appropriately spread by passive example, by perfecting it at home so that the nation would shine as John Winthrop's proverbial "city upon a hill," enticing others to voluntarily emulate the U.S. example.
Taken by itself, this observation adds little to the historiography of American foreign relations, exceptionalism, and the idea of a global mission. Many scholars have pointed to the "exegetic dilemma" of trying to deduce a specific foreign policy from exceptionalism. While the ends, the global triumph of American-style democracy, are usually agreed upon, exceptionalism does not stipulate the means for implementation. Therefore, completely diverse strategies, such as an active crusading mission and a complete abstention from world affairs for fear of being "contaminated," have traditionally been legitimized by appeals to exceptionalism. 4 Although these assertions are undoubtedly correct, I claim that the concept's elasticity is also based on its dialectic internal structure. In postulating that the United States is unique because of its democratic founding, exceptionalism combines the universal and inclusive element of "democracy" with the particularist and exclusive element of "nation." Accordingly, in the second part of this study (chapters 5-7), I intend to demonstrate that the debaters exploited this tension. The imperialists emphasized the national element, whereas their opponents insisted on the democratic aspects of American exceptionalism. 5 This distinction might seem anachronistic, since exceptionalism as a whole forms the basis of American nationalism. Therefore, it is necessary to define Introduction • 3 the "national element" as it is used in this study. Scholars of nationalism distinguish between "open" and "closed" as well as "civic" and "ethnic" nationalisms. While closed nationalisms define the in-group and its territory according to ethnic and cultural characteristics, which are supposedly fixed or have "naturally" emerged in the dark reaches of history, the open type assumes that the nation was deliberately created. An individual becomes a citizen by consent, and his or her loyalty extends more to the nation's political order than to its territorial domain. Whereas civic nationalism requires rational individual choice, ethnic nationalism appeals to a pre-rational and communal sense of belonging and obedience. 6 Although American nationalism has traditionally been identified with the civic type, traces of the ethnic variety can be found throughout U.S. history. Nativism, anti-immigration fervor, and racism illustrate that some Americans have conceived of theirs as a closed nation, endowed with a specific cultural and ethnic character that had to be protected against outsiders. Not surprisingly, strains like external war and internal debate elicited rhetoric that is more closely associated with ethnic and chauvinist nationalism than with the civic variety. When I speak of the "national element," therefore, I discuss attitudes commonly associated with this closed nationalism.
Finally, since "democracy," the other ingredient of exceptionalism, is a notoriously open-ended concept, the national creed contained additional potential that imperialists and their opponents could exploit. Even if imperialists relied on more nationalist rhetoric, they were not willing to forsake the nation's democratic heritage and ideals. On the contrary, all debaters insisted that their respective foreign policy strategies best represented and propagandized American democratic ideals. The first part of this study (chapters 1-4) will, therefore, focus on how imperialists and anti-imperialists exploited the malleability of "democracy" to claim that their recommendations were advancing the cause of democracy abroad.
This multi-pronged approach to the American imperialism debate around 1900 transcends the immediate historical example to address enduring questions about U.S. foreign policy, political culture, and discourse. By illustrating how exceptionalism was exploited by advocates and opponents of an aggressive policy overseas, this case study indicates why the belief in American uniqueness has survived strong challenges and international setbacks. Exceptionalism has received several premature obituaries, most famously by Daniel Bell after the Vietnam War, but again recently by Andrew Bacevich during the Iraq War. William James did the same after the Philippine-American War by telling an anti-imperialist audience that the national belief "that we were of a different clay from other nations" had turned out to be nothing but an "idle dream! pure [sic] fourth of July fancy." 7 Yet, as we can readily observe, the belief in exceptionalism remains alive and well.
In relation to nationalism studies, these observations confirm that we do not usually find a clear-cut juxtaposition of closed and civic conceptions of the nation. Both forms coexist even in one nation. In relation to democracy studies, debaters, unsurprisingly, did not adhere to rigid theories when they argued about empire. Instead, they "used" democracy pragmatically, exploiting theoretical ambiguities and contradictions to legitimize their foreign policy views. Nevertheless, their discussions about the relevance of American democracy in an international context alluded to basic dilemmas of democratic theory and practice, among them questions of how culturally dependent democracy is as a form of government, whether democracy should be more concerned with safeguarding the rights of the individual or of the community, and whether it is more adequately expressed in a people's mentality or in a nation's institutions.
Some readers might question the approach to the imperialism debate through the prism of exceptionalism because they see little value in the question of whether the United States is or ever was unique. This question, however, is not the focus of this study. I am concentrating on exceptionalism because it was, empirically speaking, the most important reference point of the debaters' arguments, although this debate also had inter-and transnational features. 8 In addition, I am interested in the reasons why this foreign policy discourse remains so stable, even in the face of doubts and defeat. Finally, the internal makeup of exceptionalism-that is, its democratic contents and the inherent tension between the terms "nation" and "democracy"-helps structure this investigation.
* * *
While the analytical framework of this study focuses on the "timeless" nature of American foreign policy discourse, it is equally crucial to anchor the debate in its unique historical context. This is, after all, the first in-depth study of the imperialism debate. Particularly in the 1960s, inspired by the contemporary example of antiwar activism, scholars analyzed anti-imperialist arguments and strategy, but there is a dearth of studies comparing anti-imperialism with its binary opposite. 9 Previously, scholars were more interested in why an "anti-colonial" nation embarked on colonial adventures in Asia and the Caribbean. While traditionalists have explained this period as an "aberration," in which "the United States had greatness thrust upon it," 10 revisionists have interpreted the policies as an integral part of a long-standing attempt to achieve economic global hegemony. They speak of a "tradition" of American Introduction • 5 expansionism, which extends back to the revolution and forward into the twentieth century. Therefore, they belittle the imperialism debate as one on means rather than ends, with the anti-imperialists as the cleverer champions of "informal" economic empire-a path the United States supposedly followed subsequently. 11 Belief in the continuity of American "imperialism" is shared by a third group of scholars, whose research agenda has been cultural and who are preoccupied with American attitudes toward other peoples and domestic minorities. By breaking down the boundary between the foreign and the domestic, these historians undermine the notion that nineteenth-century continental expansion was a "domestic" and therefore not an imperial(ist) venture. They highlight the continuity of racism at home and abroad. Initially, cultural historians focused on the attitudes of imperialists and on the impact of cultural concepts on policymaking. Most recently, they have turned their attention to colonial administration, whether it expressed particularly American ideas and values, and how colonial experiences impacted domestic practices. Most of these studies have not specifically addressed the imperialism debate. Nevertheless, Eric T. Love's recent monograph on the role of race in earlier nineteenth-century discussions of overseas expansion has illuminated the multiple meanings of one cultural concept-race-for the discussion of empire. Love's approach hints at the potential of a more comprehensive analysis of cultural and ideological concepts in the imperialism debate. 12 His hypothesis (and its limitations) serve as a reminder of the historical contingency of such debates. He argues that the role of racism in facilitating overseas expansion has been exaggerated in the literature and that, on the contrary, attitudes toward race served as a deterrent against empire. Nevertheless, had Love extended his analysis beyond late 1898, he would have discovered that the role of racism in the debate on expansion changed, prompting many debaters to adjust their arguments, as the second chapter of this study illustrates.
Another example of the historical contingency of the imperialism debate is the relative importance of the "national element" in imperialist rhetoric. Even a superficial comparison with other foreign policy debates shows how much the imperialists emphasized the national unit as a value in itself. This was not only a logical consequence of advocating overseas expansion, but also dependent on a contemporary wave of intense nationalism, which was fed by internal and external sources. Internally, nationhood was celebrated as a means to reunite the country one generation after the Civil War, whereas externally, the United States followed a wave of nationalist fervor that also peaked in Europe at this time.
Historical contingency thus complements the "long view" that this study takes of the formulation and discussion of U.S. foreign policy. This dichotomous approach to the imperialism debate illustrates how cultural concepts shape a nation's encounter with the outside world, how they condition responses to foreign policy challenges, and how, in turn, these challenges impact and change cultural attitudes. Ultimately, the object of this study is to show the enduring and contingent cultural backdrop against which diverse approaches to U.S. foreign policy develop and which they equally shape.
Geir Lundestad has written about the impact of exceptionalism on U.S. foreign policy: "While other states had interests, the United States had responsibilities. Its prime mission was nothing less than to save the world." 13 This recognition informs the perspective of this study and explains why I focus on those aspects of the debate that concerned American ideals and ideology and much less on specific disagreements about (narrowly defined) national interests and tactical preferences. This is a study of culture and its expression in rhetoric. "Culture" is not only a fashionable term, but also a slippery one. According to Akira Iriye, "culture in the study of international relations may be defined as the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries, and the cultural approach as a perspective that pays particular attention to this phenomenon." 14 This definition is especially suitable because it reflects the shared belief in American exceptionalism and the way in which it shaped foreign policy views. With its inherent international relevance, encapsulated in the sense of mission, the belief in exceptionalism bridges the gap between the self and the other-the "within and across," in Iriye's definition-between the particular ("nation") and the universal ("democracy"), and between the export of democracy and the impact of "imperialism" at home.
Since culture manifests itself as rhetoric in such a debate and since "experience is mediated by language," 15 it is appropriate to discuss another fashionable term, "discourse," which culture has obscured in recent years. Like many terms derived from post-structuralist and post-modernist theory, discourse is no less slippery than culture. Following Michel Foucault, Gail Bederman has formulated a useful definition: "By 'discourse,' I mean a set of ideas and practices which, taken together, organize both the way a society defines certain truths about itself and the way it deploys social power . . . [T]his methodology does not differentiate between intellectual ideas and material practices." While I am not advocating the ultimate consequence of this explanation, that our entire universe consists only of language, Introduction • 7 the definition mirrors the central contention of my study that cultural constructs, such as exceptionalism, can affect the "material practices," in this case the foreign policies, of a society. Or, as Frank Ninkovich has put it, culture does not prescribe policy choices, it describes "the field of possibility for what can and cannot be done." 16 The term "discourse" is particularly appropriate for research into exceptionalist beliefs, because these were shared by all debaters and can therefore be adequately described as the way in which an entire "society define[d] certain truths," to quote Bederman. At the same time, exceptionalism represents an extremely successful discourse becausein spite of the shared beliefs-it contained sufficient conflictual potential to permit a vigorous debate.
The notion of a discourse makes redundant the doubt that analyses of rhetoric and culture merely deal with "words" rather than with the "real" motives hidden behind public pronouncements. Instead, the entire body of language is considered important not only in reflecting, but also in shaping symbolic patterns shared by audiences and speakers alike. American rhetoric has to reflect the values of American audiences because only then can the respective speakers gain audience support. 17 By the same token, rhetoric narrows policy choices for each politician or activist because only the decisions and actions that are commensurate with the proclaimed objectives will preserve freedom of action in the future. Rhetoric is important because it reveals the value system of speaker and audience. For these reasons, I have made few attempts to distinguish rhetoric from presumably "true" motives; private and public rhetoric have been used interchangeably (unless there was a noticeable gap between the two).
Finally, a word on the uses of the terms "empire" and "imperialism." As intimated at the outset, both terms were always loaded in the American context, but even more so since the beginning of the twentieth century, when "imperialism" was increasingly associated with the capitalist economic order of the "Western" powers by communist thinkers, and also by liberals such as John A. Hobson. Subsequently, "imperialism" described not only formal annexation, but a variety of formal and informal means of hegemony: social, economic, cultural, military, and political. In the imperialism debate itself, however, "imperialism" was synonymous with colonialism, the formal acquisition and subject rule of overseas territories. The anti-imperialists applied the term to contemporary overseas expansion, and their opponents rejected the label for their policies. Only if we use this narrow definition of imperialism can we adequately represent the historical significance of the debate. As indicated above, the use of an expansive definition of imperialism has led revisionists to dismiss the debate as cynical because some anti-imperialists advocated an "informal empire," which would establish U.S. political and economic hegemony without the burden of formal administration. While there is some truth to this observation, it fails to explain why the imperialism debate was such an emotional affair, precisely because it involved more than merely the best way to dominate others, namely the implications of overseas expansion for American national identity. This, and not ideological preference, has prompted the use of a narrower definition of imperialism.
In its focus on rhetoric, this is more a study of ideas than of people. More attention has been paid to representing the prevailing views than to accounting for every important imperialist or anti-imperialist. Biographical detail has only been taken into account where it was relevant to the stance that an individual or a group might take. Nevertheless, it is important to describe the makeup of the debate's camps. Most imperialists were found in the ruling Republican Party and among its sympathizers in the elite foreign policy public of the late nineteenth century. There were some important differences, however, between "moderate" imperialists of President William McKinley's ilk and more forceful (and younger) advocates of a "large" foreign policy, such as Theodore Roosevelt or Henry Cabot Lodge.
The anti-imperialists were a more diverse group. This diversity eventually hampered their effectiveness, particularly in the elections of 1900. The most prominent and vocal part of the movement-and the group that has received the most attention in scholarly literature-consisted of "mugwumps," ex-Republicans who had bolted their party in the 1880s because they had grown disenchanted with political corruption. Before the anti-imperialist crusade, they had focused on the reform causes of the Gilded Age, especially civil service reform. As veterans of the Civil War and often of the abolitionist movement as well, these were (mostly) men for whom antiimperialism was the "last hurrah." As political independents, these debaters were fiercely individualist, although they founded local and regional "Anti-Imperialist Leagues." The most important of these was the New England Anti-Imperialist League in Boston. These leagues mainly organized gatherings and published the proceedings as well as members' individual tracts. 18 Mugwumps found themselves incongruously paired with the majority of the Democratic Party, particularly its Southern wing, which clung to a racist opposition even after other anti-imperialists had abandoned that line of argument. Perhaps because of this single-mindedness, but also because of the dubious role the party leadership played in the Senate ratification of the peace treaty with Spain in early 1899, anti-imperialist Democrats' opinions have been somewhat neglected in the scholarly literature. This already combustible Introduction • 9 mix of Democrats and ex-Republicans was supplemented by a handful of anti-expansionist Republicans, most notably Senator George F. Hoar, who harbored no sympathy for either the mugwumps or the Democrats. 19 The other group included in this study has been selected less for its pronounced opinion on imperialism and more for the repercussions of the imperialism debate on its position in American society. Since much of the imperialism debate revolved around white majority attitudes toward nonwhites abroad and since racism was central to both imperialist and anti-imperialist arguments, it is important to see how African Americans reacted to the new foreign policies and to the contention that their nation had a mission to "redeem" nonwhites. The majority of African Americans instinctively opposed imperialism, particularly the racism inherent in its justification, but also felt politically hamstrung because the Republican Party remained their "natural" political home in the times of Jim Crow. The imperialism debate thus put African Americans between a rock and a hard place, and this dilemma renders research into the community's response especially rewarding. While there are a handful of pioneering works on this subject, most authors have focused on the political choices and implications of African American responses to imperialism rather than on the arguments and ideology behind them. 20 * * * The structure of the book follows the arguments outlined above. Whereas the first part explores the connections that debaters formulated between overseas expansion and democracy, the second part analyzes the ways in which imperialists and anti-imperialists exploited the dialectic structure of American exceptionalism.
The first chapter looks at the debaters' claims of what "democracy" would entail for the respective other: the Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. "Freedom" and "liberty" were the key terms. The imperialists insisted that annexation meant liberation-from Spanish (mis)rule and from "barbarism"-and they emphasized the individual negative liberties because they were not willing to grant the positive and collective freedom of selfgovernment. Predictably, their opponents seized on this omission and claimed that the right to govern oneself was the essential precondition of true democracy, without which all other liberties were meaningless.
With racism at its center, the second chapter presents an obvious paradox: imperialists and anti-imperialists used democracy, theoretically a universal and inclusive political order, to rhetorically exclude the other. Both sides expressed their racism by discussing whether nonwhites were capable of practicing democracy. The difference between them was tactical rather than substantive: while the anti-imperialists emphasized that other races' lack of self-governing qualities was as immutable as the color of their skin, the imperialists showcased a paternalist version, insisting that Americans could teach the "natives" the art of self-government. The discussion of race did not remain static, but moved with contemporary developments in the larger imperialism debate. As soon as the McKinley administration demonstrated that neither the Philippines nor the Filipinos would ever be admitted to the Union, race lost its attractiveness as a scare tactic, at least for Northern anti-imperialists. Still, the question of race and the annexation of territories inhabited by nonwhite populations had important repercussions for African Americans at home-another important feature of the second chapter.
While the first two chapters focus on American hetero-stereotypes, or images of the other, the remainder of the work concentrates on autostereotypes, or images of the self. Imperialist and anti-imperialist conceptions of an American mission to the world form the heart of the third chapter. All debaters agreed that the United States had such a global role, but they disagreed about the precise contents and means, particularly about the question of whether this mission ought to be passively offered or actively pursued. Both sides also discussed ancillary foreign policy principles, especially the wisdom of a departure from international "isolation," and they formulated rivaling utopias, which would fulfill the global potential of exceptionalism, the "regeneration" of the world.
The fourth chapter analyzes argumentative strategies that have been neglected in the relevant literature. Imperialists and anti-imperialists not only fought about how democratic ideals ought to be expressed in foreign policy, but they equally maintained that their recommendations were democratically sanctioned at home. The McKinley administration had the obvious advantage of being able to point to a general popular mandate for its policies, particularly after the midterm elections of 1898 and after the Senate had ratified the peace treaty. Their opponents were forced to argue from a minority position. There was more to this difference, however, than necessity or convenience. This difference alluded to an important distinction in democratic theory, namely the question of whether democracy is more adequately manifested in procedural arrangements or whether it resides in a polity's substantive and institutional rules. Although their minority status forced the anti-imperialists to embrace the latter idea, they believed in it firmly as well, occasionally betraying a considerable degree of elitism toward the whims and wishes of a majority.
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